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Abstract 
Emissions trading and nutrient trading interact in critical ways. The 
agricultural sector is a major emitter of both nutrients and greenhouse gases in 
New Zealand. Thus the simultaneous implementation of such systems will have a 
large impact on the farmers in affected catchments. Many of the mitigation 
options that are available to farmers, for example reducing animal numbers, will 
reduce both nutrient loss and greenhouse gas emissions. Thus the combined cost 
of control could be much less than the sum of the costs of the separate systems. 
The allocation of units under each system will also affect the same people.   
Monitoring systems for each pollutant could have common elements but could 
also impose a double burden. The interactions between the two systems will 
complicate the decision making process for farmers and need to be considered 







New Zealand authorities are considering market-based instruments as a 
way to deal with pollution externalities including greenhouse gas emissions and 
nutrient loss causing water pollution. Nationally, an emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) is in development to assist in meeting our Kyoto obligations. In some 
catchments, nutrient trading systems are being considered, or implemented, to 
control nutrient loss into waterways where water quality is declining. A nutrient 
trading system is already in place for the Lake Taupo catchment and Environment 
Bay of Plenty is actively considering the use of a nutrient trading system for the 
Lake Rotorua catchment.  
The two types of system interact in critical ways. The agricultural sector 
is a major emitter of both nutrients and greenhouse gases in New Zealand. Thus 
the simultaneous implementation of such systems could have a large impact on 
the farmers in affected catchments. If the ETS is implemented at farm scale, some 
farmers would be required to determine and report both pollutants leaving their 
property, and buy and sell allowances as their land use and management practices 
change. They will face compliance costs (understanding the systems and 
reporting), will need to change land use and management in response to their new 
economic circumstances, and will face financial costs to the extent that they 
mitigate and need to purchase allowances.   
Responding to both systems simultaneously may reduce the total costs 
to farmers. For example, many of the emission reduction and mitigation options 
available to farmers will reduce both nutrient loss and greenhouse gas emissions.  
This is not always the case, however. Enhanced wetlands decrease nutrient loss 
off farmland, but do not decrease, and in some cases may even increase, 
greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, monitoring systems for each pollutant 
could have common elements but could also impose a double burden. Interactions 
between the two systems will complicate the decision making process for farmers 
and need to be considered when the policies are designed so they are as 
complementary as possible.  2 
This paper surveys interactions between one specific nutrient trading 
system, proposed for the Lake Rotorua catchment (see Lock and Kerr (2008)), and 
the agricultural component of the New Zealand emissions trading system. We 
discuss issues of price, reporting and verification, scope, mitigation costs, 
motivations for free allocation, and externalities over time. While we offer only a 
brief outline of each of these issues, the paper draws on our extensive policy 
research and integrated modelling work in each system.
1  
1.1 Nutrient  trading 
Nutrient trading applies market-based instruments to the problem of 
water pollution. Our work looks specifically at nutrient trading in the Lake 
Rotorua catchment, but it could be applied in a wider range of places. The system 
we propose is cap-and-trade: it has a cap on the total amount of nutrients coming 
into the lake and tradable allowances equal to the cap. The cap is equal to the level 
of nutrients required to meet an agreed environmental goal.  
Each year farmers report the nutrients leaving their property using a 
computer-based model and surrender allowances to match. If the farmer holds 
more allowances than they require these can be sold to farmers with insufficient 
allowances. The trading process will determine market price for these permits. 
Nutrients reach the lake through groundwater and surface flows. They 
cannot be seen or measured, and instead must be monitored using a model. The 
particular model being developed in New Zealand is called OVERSEER, though 
alternatives exist. Farmers input their activities and the farm’s geophysical 
characteristics and the model estimates how much nutrients are leaving the 
property each year. In particular, farmers must report animal number and location, 
and fertiliser use. 
1.2 Emissions  trading 
Agricultural emissions trading is very much in development as a core 
component of New Zealand’s proposed emissions trading scheme. The New 
Zealand government has an allocation of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) under 
                                                           
1 (www.motu.org.nz/nutrient_trading and www.motu.org.nz/climate) 3 
our Kyoto obligations, which equates to New Zealand’s allowable tonnes of 
carbon emissions. We can supplement these with carbon sequestration, and we 
can also buy units on the international market.  
The national cap and trade system is similar to that described for 
nutrient trading, but differs in that it is essentially embedded within a bigger cap 
and trade system. The national system is an attempt to devolve responsibility for 
emissions to individual actors who are capable of behavioural change. To do this, 
private sector actors will be required to acquire through free allocation or by 
purchase. Private actors are responsible for reporting information that can be used 
to model greenhouse gas emissions from their chain of production. The sum of 
individual actors emissions across all sectors and gases (plus any small sources 
excluded from the system) should add to the national obligation. For agricultural 
emissions trading, the default point of obligation for emissions is the processor, 
though assessing emissions at farm level also remains under consideration. These 
details of the scheme are yet to be determined.  
For the purposes of this paper we consider agricultural emissions 
trading at the farm level of obligation. As for nutrient trading, private actors 
surrender emission units to match emissions inferred using a model. Under a 
separate component of the ETS, if farmers have the benefits of post 1990 forestry 
or native regeneration on their land, they can claim emission units to match 
sequestration.  
1.3 Scientific  background 
We are concerned with two related sets of emissions.  Agricultural 
emissions trading controls the greenhouse gases nitrous oxide and methane. 
Nutrient trading controls nitrates and phosphorus, which cause hazardous algal 
blooms in waterways. Both pollutants are produced predominantly by pastoral 
agriculture, and related to agricultural activities.  
Farm management designed to reduce greenhouse gases can also reduce 
nutrient loss. Reducing stocking rates reduces methane and nitrous oxide roughly 
in proportion to their feed intake and can reduce nitrate loss even further. If you 4 
are already controlling gas emissions, by felicity you can also control nutrient 
losses, and vice versa. 
In some instances, the effects will not be so felicitous. For example, 
using straw bales to catch run-off reduces nutrient loss, but may increase nitrous 
oxide. This is because capturing nutrients creates more opportunity for them to 
escape into the atmosphere. 
In many cases, however, greenhouse gas regulation may not be a 
significant extra burden for farmers who already control for nutrient loss. 
Introducing an emissions trading system effectively reduces demand for nutrient 
allowances, leading to a price drop in the nutrient market. In effect, farmers will 
stop having to pay for nutrients and will instead start paying for greenhouse gases. 
2  What are the similarities and differences 
between nutrient trading and emissions 
trading? 
The burden of nutrient trading and emissions trading depends on a 
number of potential interactions between the two proposed schemes. This section 
sets out issues of price, reporting and verification, scope, mitigation costs, 
motivations for free allocation, and externalities over time.  
2.1 Price 
For nutrient trading, the Regional Council sets the nutrient cap, and the 
price is determined entirely by what happens within the catchment.  
By contrast, New Zealand has very little control over GHG emission 
prices. The Kyoto cap is set internationally through negotiations in which we are a 
very small player. For the global ‘carbon’ market we are price-takers and 
therefore exposed to international changes.  
2.2  Reporting and verification 
If agricultural emissions are reported at farm scale, reporting and 
verification is very similar for both systems. Both involve pollutants that cannot 
be directly measured, but can be modelled through OVERSEER. Our 5 
collaborators at NIWA and AgResearch are working to enhance consistency and 
accuracy in OVERSEER.  
The challenge is to design a model with verifiable data inputs that 
accurately reflect nutrient and greenhouse gas losses. The data must be verifiable 
or it would be impossible to ensure compliance. The data inputs should also 
enable a range of mitigation options. Farmers want to be able to respond to both 
systems in ways that will not cost too much.   
For both systems there is a real issue about the acceptability of 
regulation based on uncertain, inaccurate science. You can hear murmurings 
around nutrient trading and also emissions trading, saying “why are we bearing 
cost when you’re not even really sure what’s going on?” There is quite a lot of 
resistance on this basis. Traditionally resistance where science has been uncertain 
has been beneficial of farmers because it has allowed them to avoid regulation.  In 
this case however, once the inevitability of Kyoto obligations is accepted, 
acceptance of some of the uncertainty in modelling of mitigation options would 
allow farmers more flexibility and lower the burden on them. 
This raises an economic question: what is the value of extra 
information? Perfect accuracy is not possible in this situation, but how valuable is 
to be more accurate? This question is a transactions cost versus accuracy trade-off. 
There is an economic cost if negative perceptions lead to the system working 
inefficiently.  
2.3 Scope 
Another issue that arises in both systems is determining who should 
participate. For nutrient trading there are arguments for higher participation and 
arguments for lower participation. Applying the same arguments to emissions 
trading suggests that direct participation in the latter scheme should be somewhat 
lower overall. 
To maximise environmental benefit from a nutrient trading system it is 
desirable to have as many sources monitored and covered by the regulation as 
possible. It can also be difficult to monitor the activities of those who are not 6 
included. This has been seen in New Zealand fisheries, where commercial fishing 
is tightly controlled and recreational fishing has very few controls. Large 
uncontrolled sectors can become problematic over time. Those not included in the 
system as direct participants have less incentive to mitigate their nutrient losses, 
which leads to loss of efficiency.  Low cost mitigation options may not be utilised 
because they do not lead to economic advantage through the sale of allowances.  
Also having more people involved in the market may increase market liquidity, 
which could be an issue if the number of participants is really low, and might also 
avoid some market power problems. 
Transaction costs are the primary reason to limit involvement. It costs 
to comply with this sort of system, to determine and report farm nutrient losses 
and to learn how to gain the most benefit from trading. Dealing with many 
participants is also costly to the regulator who needs to verify reports and enforce 
compliance. In the prototype nutrient trading system, we propose that very small 
properties are simply made the responsibility of the district or regional council, 
which has the choice to pass on a nominal cost potentially in combination with 
regulation to lower nutrient losses. This ensures that all activity is included within 
the overall cap, but does not require considerable effort from individual 
landowners. 
The emissions trading system differs in two areas: liquidity is not an 
issue and nor is comprehensiveness of coverage of gases.
2 This is because we are 
working within an international market, whose associated regulations define all 
sources that are monitored and how. Actions in New Zealand will not affect the 
liquidity of the global market, and that would argue for lower participation in the 
trading system. In the short run, while the international market is relatively 
underdeveloped, the development of brokers who specifically deal with New 
Zealand units and the Kyoto units that will be accepted in New Zealand would 
help local liquidity. A system with lower participation would exclude sources with 
higher transaction costs and low emissions. 
                                                           
2 The New Zealand government is choosing not to regulate sources that are not covered by Kyoto 
and are closely mirroring the international rules in domestic legislation. 7 
2.4  Cost bearing and mitigation 
The major financial impact of both systems is on farm profitability, and, 
as a consequence, land values. Landowners are likely to bear the majority of the 
cost because lower land values will lead to a loss of equity. In the short run, if 
capital markets are relatively inflexible, introducing the trading systems could 
lead to possible bankruptcy even of farms that will be viable in the long run, 
particularly for people who bought farms recently and have large debts. 
Initial costs are likely to be higher than ongoing costs because farmers 
will gradually begin to reduce and mitigate emissions. We lack robust empirical 
evidence on how much they can mitigate and the costs of doing so. We do know 
that greenhouse emissions per unit of output vary considerably across farms, 
which indicates scope for mitigation. This is the case even for methane, where it is 
possible to change the efficiency with which grass (dry matter) is used to produce 
meat and milk. The question is to what extent it will be possible for farmers to 
manipulate this variation, improving their productivity and hence mitigating their 
emissions. 
We propose to use two farm models, FARMAX (sheep and beef farms) 
and UDDER (Dairy farms) combined with OVERSEER to explore these 
questions. These models do not involve explicit optimisation algorithms. A skilled 
user must try different options that they consider physically feasible to find an 
optimal outcome for the specific farmer’s situation. Based on the inputs, farm 
geophysical characteristics and management practices defined by the user, and 
using a set of production functions for the farm and animal type, the model will 
produce predictions of output as well as cash farm surplus and economic surplus.  
Different farmers may have different preference for average returns relative to risk 
as well as across management options that require their input.  
A difficulty with this modelling approach is that, in general, farmers do 
not currently optimise their activity according to this type of model. Some of this 
may be due to rational differences between a farmer’s decision problem and that 
actually modelled; part may be due to non-price barriers to more efficient farm 
operation.  Although these may appear to offer cheap (or negative cost) mitigation 8 
opportunities, these barriers may be real and certainly won’t be addressed solely 
through the ETS.   










Emission reduction – possible 





Figure 1 illustrates the empirical question. We would like more robust numbers 
about how much farmers would optimally do each of the three broad types of 
activity at different carbon prices. The more flexible farmers responses are the 
lower the individual and aggregate costs of the system will be.   
If farmers responses are to change land use or reduce intensity and hence output 
this could have negative effects in three ways. First, ‘leakage’ could lead to higher 
global emissions as a result of the ETS. Leakage arises when, as a result of carbon 
regulation in New Zealand and an incomplete global agreement, production falls 
in New Zealand and rises in a country that is not covered by the Kyoto cap.  
Regardless of New Zealand’s relative GHG efficiency in production, a movement 
of production to an un-covered country will raise their emissions above business 
as usual (BAU) while the sum of emissions under the Kyoto cap will be 
unchanged.  Thus global emissions will rise relative to BAU.  Offsetting this 
somewhat, there may be local environmental benefits from reduced production.  
These could include improvements in water quality, biodiversity and reduced 
erosion. 9 
Second, the fact that we are competing with unregulated countries in the short 
term may lead to production leaving which in the long run we would regret when 
(or if) there is a global agreement. If New Zealand is relatively GHG efficient in 
agricultural production, we will have a long-term comparative advantage in 
production and we will want a strong agricultural sector in the long term.  Losing 
efficient production in the short term could lead to long term regrets if NZ loses 
key skills, if infrastructure including processing capacity and the quality of herds 
fall in ways that are hard to quickly reverse, if land moves into forestry or 
indigenous regeneration which is relatively costly to reverse in the short term 
especially if the carbon credits associated with the forest have been sold. Short-
term reductions in output could also lead to unnecessary social pain as small rural 
communities struggle to adjust to lower economic activity.   
Third, if the fall in NZ’s food production is not replaced by increased production 
overseas, it will exacerbate the current global problem of food insecurity and high 
food prices.  The less emissions leak, the more we contribute to food shortages.  
The challenge is to trade off the lower burden in New Zealand from allowing 
production to fall (also avoiding the costs of protecting production) and the 
emissions leakage, long term regret, and food insecurity effects. 
2.5  Motivations for free allocation 
Allocating free allowances is a contentious issue in any trading system 
because of the high value of the allowances and the considerable costs that 
regulation can impose. For nutrient trading in Lake Rotorua, the key issues are 
fairness and smoothing transition into the new market regime. We propose that 
landowners initially receive allowances proportional to their current nutrient loss 
but lower so that landowners bear some of the costs of achieving the 
environmental target. Over time, our proposed allocation mechanism would 
transition to one based on potential nutrient loss on each land parcel. This avoids 
locking in current land use, or rewarding high nutrient loss properties indefinitely. 
For example land that is currently in forest, with very low nutrient loss, but that 
has high potential for sheep farming, or Maori land that is currently under 
developed, would be penalised if allocation was entirely on the basis of current 
nutrient loss.  A measure of potential nutrient loss is yet to be developed, but will 10 
need to incorporate land characteristics and potential stocking rates alongside a 
basic model of ‘standard management practices’.   
For agricultural emissions trading, where there are 33.7 million tonnes 
per annum of free units to allocate, the key issues are fairness, transition, and 
production falls leading to emissions leakage, long-term regrets and food security. 
Free allocation is the only mechanism able to address leakage in the current 
scheme. Emissions leakage does not apply to nutrient trading, since the proposed 
scheme is self-contained within the Lake Rotorua catchment. The other effects on 
water quality elsewhere or food security are likely to be small and are not 
considered a critical local issue. There is no possibility of long-term regret 
because changes in profitability as a result of the scheme are not transitional or 
dependent on external agreements. 
Figure 2: Decision tree for allocation to address leakage and economic regrets. 
 
No 
Would the farm maintain production 
with a global agreement? 
Do not protect  Do long-term farm benefits 
justify maintaining production 
despite lower short-term 
returns? 
Yes
Do not need 
to protect 
No 
Do potential social losses exceed the 
cost of protection?   
Yes 
Policies to protect production 
of at-risk products would 
provide potential value. 
No 





Figure 2 explores the decisions required to allocate to avoid leakage and 
economic regret in the emissions trading scheme. The final question in this 
decision tree asks whether the potential social losses exceed the cost of free 
allocation, which is very expensive. This is another question requiring empirical 
evidence. We are working to collect evidence on potential production falls and 
emissions leakage in agriculture to give us a more robust idea of the sources and 
likely magnitudes and the effects of that leakage.   11 
2.6  Timing of Environmental Effects 
Another issue shared by the emissions and nutrient markets is that 
actions at a one point in time can have environmental consequences at different 
times. In the Lake Rotorua catchment, nutrient loss can take between 0 and 200 
years to reach the lake, depending on a property’s geophysical characteristics and 
location. Excess nutrients from some properties can go straight into the lake and 
cause water quality issues now, while nutrients from other properties will take 200 
years to filter into the soil and through an aquifer before reaching the lake.  
Our proposed nutrient trading system addresses this issue through 
vintage allowances. We propose creating a series of markets with their own 
targets, each related to a particular time period. Each property will have a 
groundwater lag associated with it, and landowners will purchase (or be allocated) 
allowances for the time period their nutrients reach the lake. For example, a 
property with a 1-5 year lag will surrender 2010-2014 allowances to match 2009 
nutrient loss. A property with a sixty-year lag will surrender 2059-2069 year 
allowances to match the same action on their farm. This allows authorities to set 
water quality targets with greater confidence than would be possible with a single 
market. 
For emissions trading, the comparison is not location but emissions 
type: carbon dioxide, methane and nitrogen monoxide each have different 
pollution outcomes over time. The New Zealand emissions trading scheme 
converts each pollutant to CO2 equivalents using global warming potentials 
(GWPs) following UNFCCC and Kyoto rules, but these rules do not distinguish 
medium and long-term effects. 
It is an open question whether the same approach can be applied to the 
global climate agreement. The relative treatment of different gases and the current 
use of GWPs is an important issue for New Zealand where we have high levels of 
methane emissions, which has a very high global warming potential but whose 
current emissions will have little or no impact on the climate in 100 years. Two or 
more international markets for mid-term and long-term emissions targets would 
increase the accuracy of the environmental targeting and the economic efficiency 
of the global mitigation effort.  12 
2.7 Conclusions 
Emissions trading and nutrient trading are two related markets 
developing at the same time. We can take advantage of this situation by 
maximising complementarities and benefit from learning across markets. The 
markets have common challenges requiring innovative economic thinking and 
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